Cuts From The Offensive Playbook: Ryan Odom’s System

Welcome to the first of two major installments outlining what we can expect (if history is any indicator) from Ryan Odom’s basketball systems and philosophy. These pieces will certainly not be all-encompassing, as would be impossible given his body of work, but the intent will be to create an understanding of the framework within which he typically operates and how to apply that to what our rosters will look like as they begin to be fleshed out for the 2025-2026 season and beyond.

As we begin to get a body of work on the court at JPJ and see what Coach Odom’s vision looks like at a high-major level, these may get some updates, or refinement, or subsections, as applicable. For now, we’ll take a look at some tape from each of his previous three stints as head coach – VCU, Utah St., and UMBC – what he did consistently across the three programs and what nuances there were depending on his roster. I’ll focus most on the most recent two stops, as they represent his most current work and a closer level of competition to this; but it’s an interesting exercise as the strengths of the rosters against their competition were all pretty different. VCU, an athletic roster stronger on the defensive side of the ball, Utah St. a crisp offensive unit with a high level of shooting and good size, but limited athleticism, and UMBC – a bit of a hybrid of both especially considering their regular competition.

He won primarily from the defensive side of the ball with VCU, and primarily from the offensive side with Utah St.; which shows a schematic versatility and ability to lean into the strengths of his roster. It should come as no surprise if you’re a long-term reader that this is something I love; the ability to adjust coaching style, emphasis, and dramatic adjustments based on the makeup of your roster!

In this piece, we’ll tackle his offensive approach and systems, saving the defense for the next entry. Let’s get into it – new stuff!

Preface

One of the things I most appreciate about Ryan Odom’s coaching is that he has a system and philosophy of play, but he’s also very adaptable in how he utilizes the strengths and weaknesses of his roster within that system. As such, there were a lot of similarities across all of VCU, Utah St., and UMBC in terms of core guiding principles and within offensive sets; but there were key differences in points of emphasis and tactical decisions. Some of this was counter-intuitive. Utah St., for example, got out in transition less regularly than either VCU or UMBC. They less frequently pushed the ball up the floor (although they did some tactically, as we’ll see) and more regularly looked to run their offense to get a look for one of their many high-quality shooters (their 38.7% from deep was good for 10th in the nation that final 2023 season). And yet, in Odom’s final season at Utah St., they finished 111th in tempo compared to 246th this year for VCU and 208th in his final year at UMBC. Some of that was the ability to execute and get to a high-quality shot more quickly, and some of that is that VCU was a much better offensive rebounding team (#13th nationally at 36.9% compared to Utah State’s 241st ranking in 2023); prolonging possessions.

The main point being here just to re-emphasize that he’s comfortable playing to the strengths of his roster and adjusting accordingly without changing the DNA of how he likes his teams to play. So, how do his teams like to play on the offensive side of the ball?

Early Offense

Odom loves to push the ball in transition. Don’t let the below-average tempo numbers from this past season fool you. He wants to get the ball up the floor, force the defense to sprint back and pick up, attempt to cause confusion, and get an early shot (preferably a three or a layup/dunk) within the first 10 seconds on the shot clock. Now, if his teams cannot find quality early offense, then his teams get into their base offense and run that through until they get a good look – which we’ll get to – but don’t get it mistaken; they’re very aggressive about trying to get offense early. They do this by being quick and aggressive in their outlet passing, immediately looking up the floor and trying to get the best and longest pass to force the issue. Additionally, any of their players save maybe sometimes the Center (but sometimes him too) have the greenlight to immediately start attacking the other way; so you might have the PF go coast-to-coast or force the defense to pick him up and set up an assist somewhere else.

All of his teams did it VCU>UMBC>Utah St. in terms of aggression because those rosters were more athletic and capable of pushing the pace, but also because Utah St. was more efficient out of the base offense. They also do this with a wide variety of purpose; sometimes to get ahead of the pack and finish easy baskets, sometimes to create confusion within the defense that wouldn’t otherwise be there, and sometimes to leverage mismatches with how the defense recovers, forcing a big to pick up a guard or vice-versa. They’re good at finishing at the rim in transition but also in drawing the defense and looking for kick outs for threes, pulling up from deep if they aren’t picked up, and running a secondary break where they still run some offense but it comes quickly enough before the defense is fully set.

This can lead to a chaotic-seeming playstyle at times, especially when contrasting with our playstyle of the past 15 years. His teams rarely have a turnover rate per possession in the top 100 teams, although for contrast VCU finished 117th in the country this past season and our notoriously cautious Cavaliers finished 181st this past season. His teams take shots we’ve been conditioned to think are not high-quality looks at times; some that are contested, some that are early, some that are difficult (we’re going to see a higher volume of step-back threes in general). And sometimes his teams concede points the other way as a result of the pressure they’re attempting to put on their opponents through pushing the ball.

But here’s the thing – just as our system was designed to slow the pace, limit mistakes, and value every possession – this is the intent of this system – and we’ll see it in the half court too but….

Hunt looks before the defense has an opportunity to set.

Force the other team to work to get back – exhaust them!

Three-point attempts are valued – VCU was 20th in the nation at three-point attempt rate despite being the 206th best team in the country at it (33.6% as a team).

And everyone, usually at least 1-4 and sometimes more depending on the Center, is empowered and encouraged to shoot them – which builds their confidence.

I’ve been teasing this a little bit on social media in anticipation of the blowback. Many fans are ready to move on from some of the pacing rigors of the CTB system: Passing up good for great shots, discouraging certain players from shooting open shots early because we can “always” get those, walking the ball up the court to save energy and to protect the basketball. Many fans say that they welcome this change.

But….

It’s my belief that after 15 years of conditioning and embracing all of these things that change is going to be hard-earned. A few turnovers being too aggressive, some “bad” shot selection by CTB standards, and it’s going to be hard to escape the handwringing. For so long, our identity as a program has been about limiting those things (and playing great defense, which we will still attempt to do, just differently – do be addressed in the next piece). But I encourage fans who think this all sounds well and good but then immediately recoil when they see some of the costs of doing business to realize that this, too, has a bigger picture.

Generation of easy points.

Generation of fatigue in your opponents (physical and mental).

Creating a safe space to play aggressively and free; reducing the fear of mistakes (but not rewarding carelessness).

That’s the vision for a team that plays hard and selflessly. There will be pain points to get there, and they’ll look wildly different than those we’ve historically had – but recognize that there is a vision and purpose behind it.

Okay! Without further adieu, let’s look at some of this early offense:

This first clip is from VCU this year vs. GMU in the A-10 final. I was at this game live and one of the first things I noticed was that after almost every turnover or defensive rebound, Odom would gesture animatedly with his arm, encouraging his team to push the ball up the floor faster. It was a stark contrast with how UVa spoke about running more this past offseason but never did much of anything to show a commitment to that. Odom would get visibly frustrated if he thought his guys weren’t forcing the issue enough.

Anyway, this is a blocked shot and rebound defending in transition. That’s Luke Bamgboye (#9) who collects the rebound, who was recently at a visit at UVa. Notice how once he grabs the board he immediately turns and looks down court and fires the most aggressive outlet pass available to him, skipping over two other teammates in the process. This is an outlet designed to cover maximum distance and attack. VCU then attacks what is the equivalent of a 2-on-4 break. There are no numbers here, but Joe Bamisile (#22) drives it to the three-point line, threads the needle across the court to the leaked out Phillip Russell (#1) who spots up and fires away (drawing/embellishing the opportunity at the four-point play in the process).

You don’t need numbers to push – you just need to be aggressive and hunt and open look. If you get one, take it. It doesn’t matter if it’s 3-on-1 or 2-on-4; it just matters that it’s open.

Here’s another look from the same game (and captured the Odom “hurry!” gesture). This time, the rebounder pushes the ball up the floor himself. VCU isn’t out ahead of GMU at all; their entire 5 are back on defense, turning and looking to pick someone up. All Zeb Jackson (#2) does is get the ball up the floor quickly, dribble it toward Jack Clark (#4) hand it off behind him and let him fire away for the dagger.

Now, Clark was VCU’s 6’10” Power Forward. He had ball skills and could shoot it from outside to the tune of 34.8% from three on the season. But, coming into the A-10 tournament he was barely shooting 33% from deep. In fact, in his four seasons prior (with quality playing time) for LaSalle twice, N.C. State, and Clemson, he’d only shot at least 30% from three in one of those four seasons (27.6%, 29.8%, 28.9%, and 30.2%). This is a guy who certainly could shoot threes – but had he historically been that good at it?

He upped his shooting percentage in his 6th year of eligibility by almost 5 full percentage points under Odom and went on a little heater in the tournament. Why did he go on a little heater? Probably in no small part because he was encouraged to hunt early threes like this without needing a ton of space to do so and without having to think about it too much. Confidence.

I think about Jack Clark shooting 27.6% in his first season getting quality playing time and 6’10” Jacob Cofie, already weighing 15lbs more, shooting 24.4% from deep this past season after becoming increasingly more timid with his outside shot as the season progressed. I wonder what Odom could do with him.

Back to it, but still speaking of Clark, here he is pushing the ball coast-to-coast after gathering a steal himself:

Yes, that’s good ball control and speed from a 6’10” guy, but it’s not like he was far out ahead of the defense. He had license to out-race the man next to him and to take on the GMU defender near the hoop. And that’s the thing, and you’ll see it later with other teams, most guys on the court have the greenlight to attack when they first get the ball.

Here’s a look at how they create mismatches out of it and exploit. This is G Zeb Jackson (#2) taking the outlet and pushing it up the floor. The way VCU fills the floor, Clark #4 has to be taken by GMU’s 6’4″ Brayden O’Connor, with the natural matchup, GMU’s 6’7″ PF Zach Anderson (#10) having to pick up Jackson. Jackson identifies this and, initially, looks to isolate and attack but, thinking better of it, instead forces Anderson to have to defend a dribble exchange with Joe Bamisile (#22). GMU gets lost in the Guard/Forward switching across VCU’s two guards. Anderson is slow to react to the hand off as his teammate gets caught up on Jackson’s screen for just long enough for Bamisile to turn the corner and hit the floater in the lane.

It’s a simple enough play and, really, is just isolation into a DHO guard-to-guard exchange. But VCU’s hustle to get their players down the court and Jackson pushing the ball up in a hurry forced the awkward mismatch that they could exploit.

Let’s put a pin in that thought and carry it over, now, to his time with Utah St. VCU’s roster was quite athletic 1-5. They had some length in the frontcourt, but all of their guys could run, were quick, and could turn the game into a track meet if they wanted. Utah State did not have that same athleticism – but they did have size and ball skill.

Now, this is their PF, 6’9″ Taylor Funk. He shot 37% from three on the season, and scored just over 13ppg as an outside-in threat. This break from the Aggies doesn’t have the same pace or urgency you see from VCU, but it’s still intentional. He gets the ball up the floor, accepts the ball screen, and uses the resulting mismatch to go to work on the block against a smaller player.

Utah State had to pick their spots more than either VCU or UMBC because of their roster composition, but they absolutely still looked for and took their chances. Here’s a look from the same game in the Mountain West Tournament against New Mexico. They’re up 14 at this point with 1:18 to go. Certainly, they could have gone conservative here and worked the clock. Instead, the aggression is hardwired into them and you get a steal, a short outlet, a one-handed outlet to mid-court, another quick baseball pass ahead, and an alley-oop back!

At the point you’re shot-putting the ball multiple times well-ahead with about a minute to go, you can tell it’s just core to the team’s DNA to look for it when it’s there.

Here’s some more from the Aggies, and this time against the same San Diego St. squad that made the NCAA Tournament Final – but this in a closely contested Mountain West Final. This clip doesn’t all under the 10 second offense rule but does show how them getting the ball up the floor briskly allowed them to get into a quick ball screen, force a small-to-big switch, and exploit that mismatch with a lob inside.

Here’s a look from the same game of them giving an outlet ahead, forcing the defense to react to a drive and collapse, and then running secondary offense off of that by passing back out to the high post and curling a DHO off of him for a midrange jumper.

And this is what I mean by having a philosophy (that’s clearly in play when you see the alley-oop above) but also tailoring that to your roster. Utah State used the break more sparingly and in a more controlled way; often using it to get into secondary offense for high-quality looks. But it was still a part of their core strategy, just executed differently.

Let’s jump, now, to UMBC. I’m only featuring the final year Odom had them with all of these teams, but will focus on UMBC the least of the three because it’s the farthest removed. That being said, the Retrievers were a bit of a hybrid of the other two teams and you can still get a sense of applicability because their competition against a solid Vermont team, here, is on par to them with how these other mid-majors matched up against the Rams and Aggies. UMBC was also the primary foundation on which much of Odom’s coaching philosophy was built.

Here we see a nice steal on an attempted lob entry pass. This is wing Keondre Kennedy (#0) just pushing the ball himself with no brakes and elevating to knock down the (banked!) jumper from the free throw line.

Here, below, it’s 6’10” Brandon Horvath – their Center who followed Odom to Utah St. the following season. He ultimately misses the shot after the post move, although his teammate keeps the possession fighting for the offensive rebound, but the notable thing here, to me, is how he pushes the ball himself after fighting for the rebound. Doing so allows him to target a mismatch, forcing a smaller Vermont player to pick him up and deal with a back down while the others align to those UMBC players behind the play.

Here, below, it’s that same set, just with a different player bringing the ball up in a controlled way. Ball screen on the side with the other three over-loaded to the top, secure the switch/mismatch, attack the rim (draw the foul).

Of note, this variant of Odom’s breaks is a lot like what we often did in 2022-2023, clearing out a side in transition and setting a ball screen for Kihei to let him attack the basket opportunistically.

Here’s a more opportunistic look from the Retrievers. They get the steal but it doesn’t lead to a direct run out ahead of the defense. The ball-handler simply pushes it up the floor after the steal, dumping it off to his teammate on the wing, who weaves through the Vermont defenders to get a bucket at the rim.

Under CTB or Sanchez, our team would have likely just slowed the ball, waited for teams to clear the backcourt, and then brought it up and set the offense. There wasn’t a numbers advantage here, but UMBC’s willingness to test the waters and attack created an opportunity at the rim with relatively little resistance. It’s all about mindset in this case.

A final example from UMBC, but one that similarly shows their philosophy, as did the end of that Utah St. game. Vermont is pressing, down 10 points with just under three minutes to go in the game. The Retrievers break the pressure and pass the ball ahead, creating a 3-on-1 advantage ahead of the Vermont recovering press. Certainly, they could have slowed the ball and tried to run clock – but that would pass up the high percentage opportunity at getting a basket here. Instead, they outlet the ball ahead, attack the sole remaining defender, and pass it off for an easy layup.

I like the confidence and willingness to attack the pressure here trying to actively score when presented a quality opportunity, not just to run clock.

Now, I’m going to close this section by returning to VCU because it’s the most logical extreme of this philosophy Odom has had. Utah St. wasn’t as good at creating the opportunities, but they were opportunistic and savvy about picking their spots. UMBC was a bit of a mix. But VCU really forced the issue because they had the personnel to do so. So, let’s take a look at some more of that….

Here they are hunting the transition three against New Mexico, identifying where the gap-responsible defenders where too deep and exploiting it with a cross-court pass.

Similarly, here they are against Colorado St., this time springing out and probing the lane, but returning the pass on the kick out to get a very clean look for the trailer, Max Shulga (#11), for the three.

Notice how they’ll hunt the three in transition in addition to some of the looks around the rim we’ve seen and will see. I also like how Shulga knew to fill behind the drive for the kickout and Bamisile knew where to find him for the return pass. That’s familiarity and practice.

Here’s a pretty neat look, below, where they turn a blocked three-point attempt into a run out. This is a look that most teams would take with a one-on-one in the open court at the rim, but what I find most compelling about this play is the setup. Notice how after the block, Bamisile (#22) makes no attempt to go to the ball to secure it. He trusts his teammate for that. Instead, his impulse reaction after the block is to immediately start running the floor, knowing that he’s going to get the outlet.

That’s just the result of conditioning (physical, sure, but more mental). I can picture us making the same play on a blocked three and everyone on the defense rallying to secure the ball and, having done so, then bringing the ball slowly up the court against a set defense. When we talked the past few years about what we’d need to do to get more in transition – it’s this mental shift of getting out and sprinting ahead at the first sign of an opportunity that will create these opportunities.

Here they are creating a secondary break after a missed free throw of all things, when defensive balance is already set up from some of the offensive players not being able to form around the lane. Still. Off the miss VCU outlets to gain momentum, they push the ball up the court, pass to a trailer who drives and kicks back out to a teammate who then drives the gap created by his drive for the finish.

The reason this is called a secondary break is because you don’t get the points off of the initial break; but the continuation of that pressure is what yields the bucket. All of this is connected. Getting the ball up the floor quickly keeps the defense from being comfortable/set up, the initial drive tests that, and the drive that scores takes advantage of the space created by the first drive. In this case, it’s just incremental pressure that eventually gets there.

And here’s a neat little look where a steal and run out doesn’t immediately lead to an opportunity, but Bamisile uses the opportunity to take his man in the post, and then Jennings (#0) cuts backdoor away from his post up action, creating a wide-open layup under the hoop.

But, look, with all of this IS going to come with an increase in turnovers. Like this one, nearly hitting a beautifully aggressive outlet (with a pass on the money) but just having it not work out because of the speed of the play and a slight bobble:

Or this one, where Zeb Jackson (#2) just jams it into the lane too aggressively with a defender back and two others closer to him than anyone else on his team. It’s a nice read and strip, but also would have been a tough finish with the Lobos collapsing either way. The result is a runout the other way and a forced foul in the open floor.

Or this one, at the end of a game trying to get back in it and just playing too fast/forcing too difficult of a pass (the clock certainly played a role in this one but there were still around 20 seconds down just four):

It’s going to be a necessary evil, but it’s part of the design of the system.

When it’s working at it’s best, you’ll see physical, intense, and smothering defense (spoiler for the next piece) translate into instant offense – for the full picture, like here:

I, for one, will be looking forward to seeing the Orange-and-Blue streaks whipping up and down the floor (can’t wait to see Chance Mallory and Elijah Gertrude in transition).

But I encourage you, fans of our ball control offenses or yore, to recognize that the aggression is intentional. It’s part of a broader strategy across both phases of the ball (that we’ll continue to capture here and in the defensive piece), to wear your opponent down by putting as much pressure as you can on them in every phase of the game.

Alright. That was fun! Let’s now take a look at what happens when the early looks aren’t there and Odom’s teams get into their base offenses.

Core Offensive System

Okay, so keep all of the above in mind for this next section. The offensive system is based around trying to get quick offense, especially after misses and turnovers, and then running offense from there if that doesn’t shake out. That might lead you to believe that Odom’s teams look for a quick shot at and point they have the ball. Now, while they certainly won’t turn down a good look generated by the offensive flow, I’d definitively say this isn’t the case. Odom’s offenses in the half court run their stuff and they can be patient; with a variety of looks, wrinkles, and options to generate a quality chance while also giving their guys opportunities to step up and make plays.

So, what is his halfcourt offense? The beauty of many modern offense is that they pull a little bit from many different offensive styles and can integrate them into one system. What I do know is that it has a variety of concepts and, while they’ll often dedicate an entire possession to one of the concepts, you’ll also see all of them interwoven together in some possessions – making it clear that it’s all one system just with different actions/strategies within it. In this piece, I’ll highlight the distinctive actions and styles and then how they can all come together.

The offense itself is primarily 4 or 5-out, with most actions coming around the perimeter with good spacing; but occasionally sending someone pre-emptively low to fight for offensive rebounds, post up, or be there to help finish. It’s mostly described as a motion/drive-and-kick offense – but there are motion elements to it, there are drive-and-kick elements to it, there are ball screen elements to it, there is some isolation, there are DHOs and zoom screens, there are designed post-ups; there’s a lot going on and a lot to work with.

In the past, Odom has said:

“Everything we do is based on the individuals and the match-ups. You’re not only looking at what the offense can and can’t do but what the defense can and can’t do against that offense.”

“We never want our ball to slow down. We call it ‘keeping it hot.’ We’re constantly working on driving the ball to the basket, stopping, pivoting, kicking.”

“From an offensive perspective we try to get the other team in scramble as quickly as we can.”

And, ““It’s one thing to just say, ‘We just want to run motion, just move around and drive-and-kick in space’ but you have to give them some things you really want them to do.”

That will give you a general feel for the goals and focus of the offense as you see some of the looks below – keeping the ball moving to force the defense to work, rotate, play catchup, tailoring your offensive focus both to what you do but also what the matchup and your opponent does/doesn’t do, and having core concepts but also having specific things/looks/actions that you will run by design within those concepts.

Three-Man

Odom’s offenses to have plenty of looks where they’ll clear out a side and play a two-man game or let someone post up, and we’ll look at those in a minute, but the most common looks within his offense, not a-typical to many modern offenses, is to have two players in each corner ready for passes and catch-and-shoot opportunities and three others playing off of each other. Now, who is in the corners can be variable and there are many sets in which these pieces interchange throughout or proactively engage those players; but they generally keep that balance throughout and then interplay the others with a series of ball and off-ball screens.

Here’s a good first look at this from VCU in this season’s A-10 final. This is a cute little three-man game with two ball handlers; their PG (the 6’0″ Phillip Russell), and one of their two off-guards (both play on the ball a lot) in 6’5″ Max Shulga (#11). They’re playing alongside Center, rim-runner, but the only non-outside shooting player in their starting lineup, the 6’10” Luke Bamgboye. Odom’s offenses typically love as many guys who can shoot from outside as possible (as most offenses do), and he encourages his players to play beyond the arc and to have a range of at least two-feet beyond the arc to create better spacing. He will often play with one non-shooter, though, as his primary screener, rim-runner, and post-up threat, when applicable. None of VCU’s bigs were huge back to the basket threats – as none were overly strong or skilled in that way – and only Jack Clark (#4) put the ball on the floor much/was a threat to shoot from outside. So, when you see Bamgboye or the 6’10” Christian Fermin (#21), assume they’re going to be used as finishers, rim-rummers, and offensive rebounders first and foremost.

Here, Russell brings the ball up the floor, Shulga gives a pretty token dive into the lane and pops back out (sometimes Odom’s offenses are much more intentional about setting this screen and re-screen, or, “Ricky” screen) with the design just to get the ball. Russell dives into the lane with Bamgboye moving up to set a ball screen for Shulga. Shulga takes his dribble wide to the wing, Russel attempts to get a token back screen on the big, but is really setting up his man to get caught on the pin down screen from Bam. He uses the space created to drive right, force the recovery, step back from the available spacing, and knock down the midrange jumper.

Don’t let the midrange jumper fool you. They’re there within the flow of the offense, but Odom’s offense does much more typically generate threes or shots at the rim – but his guys will take the looks that are there. This was nice interplay between Bam and the three guards, but this also isn’t a-typical of an Odom offense that his players use the bounce to exploit the openings created by the actions.

Here’s a play off of that one against Colorado St. It starts with Shulga getting that screen and re-screen from Fermin (#21). They’re much more intentional about it here, running Shulga’s man into Fermin twice before he gets the ball, making him anticipate it. Shulga gets the ball and Fermin goes and lingers to set a ball screen on his man. Instead, simultaneously, Shulga whips it back over to Zeb Jackson (#2) and Fermin dives to the hoop, surprising and beating his man for the layup.

I like the design and the thoughtfulness of taking advantage of the repetitive and expected action the defense thought was coming.

In the same game, then, you’ve got that same re-screen action, less physical, to free Shulga, but then he uses the ball screen from Fermin, Fermin moves away to set an off ball screen for Bamisile (#22), who takes the pass back from Shulga and drives the space created by the screen. Fermin dives and the higher percentage play is probably for Bamisile to hit this alley oop opportunity here, but instead he hits the nice runner.

It’s really pretty when it comes together like that, and it’s like a game of cat and mouse where the defense is thinking about what they’ve already done and they’re playing off of that with continuous action and awareness between the three.

Now, this offense was absolutely in VCU’s repertoire, but they did other things more often. Let’s take a look now at some of his other teams running this same three-man action and some of the other options within it.

Utah St. was Odom’s best offensive team of the three – and this 2023 iteration of the team finished 16th in the country in Kenpom’s efficiency rankings. What it lacked for in athleticism and some individual playmaking, it made up for in execution and shooting prowess. It still had Max Shulga on the roster, also sniper 6’0″ Steven Ashworth (#3) at PG, of Creighton fame more recently. From there, though, 6’8″ wing Sean Bairstow (#2) who could handle the ball but not in the same way you saw from the VCU guards, 6’9″ Taylor Funk, the versatile sharpshooting PF, and 7’1″ Center Trevin Dorius (#32) who did not shoot a single three that season.

Here we see Shulga running the point and Ashworth initiates by coming off of a pin down screen from Dorius and flaring out to the wing. And he… doesn’t do anything with it; immediately passing right back to Shulga and taking another screen from Dorius to cross in front of Shulga. Notice, again, Funk and Bairstow lurking in the corners. All of the Ashworth actions ended up being a decoy (although it didn’t have to be) and Shulga then runs a pick and roll with Dorius who is open streaking down the lane, takes the pass, and NOW when the help comes Bairstow Cuts From The Corner (have to capitalize it the first time I say it, don’t I?) to take the pass and draw the foul.

Really nice window dressing to distract from what ends up just being a nice pick and roll and also good alertness from Bairstow to anticipate the need to get into the play.

Here, below, is that same action only this time with Funk instead of Ashworth and Dan Akin (#30) setting the screens. Funk takes the screen and flashes to the corner, takes the ball, and again returns it to Shulga. He cuts right back across in front of Shulga again, getting another screen from Akin. This time he takes the pass, though, and elevates right into a three-pointer.

It’s a good example of how they iterate off of similar looks AND of the confidence Funk has in elevating into his shot over a solid contest.

Here’s a slightly different take as Funk (#23) starts at greater depth, close to the hoop. Dorius sets a ball screen for Shulga and rolls, ostensibly toward the hoop, but it’s actually to set the pin down for Funk, freeing him for the three-pointer.

Next up, we see some extended play out of the set. This time Funk takes a pass on the wing and kicks it right back to Shulga again. Rather than staying stationary, Shulga dribbles toward the vacated spot, and rather than fully crossing, Funk baits like he might dive and pops back out to the point. Akin represents a screen and then slides down the lane a bit, and the ball goes back to Shulga who, in turn, takes a DHO and uses Funk as a screen. He pops back out to the point with the ball while Funk gathers depth, and dribbles at him, using him as a screen again and forcing another switch by New Mexico. Funk hustles back out to the point and takes a return pass from Shulga, gets his recovering man into the air on the shot fake, and then drives it to hit the floater.

The play wasn’t executed as cleanly as some of the others here. They’re not all exactly on the same page. At one point Funk seems to think Akin will screen for him and he doesn’t, Ashworth unnecessarily brings his man into the play before Funk’s shot fake, and Akin leaves the short corner to flash into the lane, bringing his man up to help on the Funk drive. It was all a little clunky. That being said, continual execution of the set and quality skill ended up creating a quality opportunity and nice finish that got the job done.

Alright, now let’s take a look at the birthplace of this stuff for Odom, UMBC. This iteration of the Retrievers had Darnell Rogers (#2) who, at 5’2″ was the shortest player to every play Division I men’s basketball. At UMBC, Odom had a lot of success with under-sized guards which is worth calling out considering the commitment of Chance Mallory to the program. Anyway, this is a different variation on that three-man interplay. UMBC sends both bigs up to set double screens for Rogers, switching sides and setting up some decoy actions before finally putting bigs on either side, having one screen away from the ball for the other and then set the ball screen for Rogers. Rogers uses the space to start a drive, force his man into a recovery angle that’s deep enough that he can back step outside of the three-point line and bury a three.

This is the kind of bombs-away mindset and skillset that Mallory brings to the team – so it’s notable to see how Rogers was encouraged to exploit the defense’s coverage in this way.

Now this next one is a little set that sometimes they get to out of their motion/zoom stuff, but it’s also part of their three-man package where they just set it up from the jump. It’s interesting to note the different ways that they get into similar looking things sometimes, as it can confuse the defense in recognition and then, if they do recognize, the variants off of which they play the sets can also surprise/make prediction difficult. Same three-man, two men in the corners. They set a stagger screen with the two bigs around the three-point line with the ball handler running off of both. Here, the dribbler goes wide, passes it back to 6’10” Center Brandon Horvath (#12) who then uses the shot threat to beat his man off of the dribble with the floater.

There are a ton of variations with this stagger screen, which we’ll see, that often just relies on how the defense is playing. Sometimes the ball handler will go hard and attack, sometimes they’ll change direction mid-turn and only use one screen, reversing the other way, sometimes the screeners will roll to the hoop, etc. Lots of read and react options here.

This was one of my favorites of these variants where they set it up the same way – but notice this time that the near-side corner cuts through to the opposite side. This time Bamisile (#22) looks to be setting up this screening action again, but instead he uses it as a decoy, rejects it, drives, draws the defense, kicks the ball to the opposite wing, who swings it to that corner who cleared out. The shot misses but it’s a pretty look and a nice design/play off of the stagger set.

This is the last look at this section. Notice the same familiar setup where you’re going to get that initial ball screen from a big with the other big setting the screen for him to cross – but this time the ball handler takes advantage of the switch created from the ball screen to press the advantage and drive for the score.

Alright, so that’s what I’m calling three-man for now – but it’s really a set where the two corner men stay available to keep help defenders home and the other three guys play off of each other in a variety of ball screen and off-ball screen actions from a variety of angles and initiation points.

To go a little simpler, let’s now look at a more simple ball screen/two-man game offense that they run as well.

Ball Screen Actions

Odom’s offenses don’t always need the more complex wrinkles with the extra man (although I do like the options that brings). They’ll often simplify and just run a classic pick and roll. They’ll often do it on a cleared out side with the other three players spread around the arc from the point to the opposite corner, but they’ll sometimes just run it right down Broadway with a wing offset – similar to our most recent version of Flow. The ball handler will attack the basket where he can, pass to his big on the roll, or sometimes they’ll use it just to set up a post up if they like their matchup. They’ll also use it to draw help and pass to a teammate not initially in the design for a drive or three. Let’s take a few looks:

We’re back to VCU again against Mason. You have their big starting low with the ball handler out top, two in the corners as per usual and their PF on the wing as a stretch option. The ball handler takes the ball screen away from the heavy side of the floor (with two teammates) but Mason is pretty aggressive about helping to shade the roll. Jack Clark (#4) reads this help and rotates closer to the play, creating more space between the close out from his defender. He takes the return pass and takes a dribble in before shooting the open three (he misses).

Now, you’d rather Clark take this angle less deep so that he can just catch and shoot when he gets this pass rather than having to take a dribble and step into his shot. That being said, the shot was there, the read was correct, and it got a clean look.

Here it is, below, with Utah St. setting it up through a DHO but with a clear two-man action, getting the pass to the diver deep in the lane and getting fouled at the rim.

Another look from the Aggies where they get a tasty alley-oop to the screener late in the half, below:

Just a really subtle thing about that play that I want to call out is how Ashworth (#2) cuts from the wing to the strong-side corner and bumps the guy who was there out. It might not seem like much, but it occupies the defense’s attention while the play is initiating and removes that defender from being in decent help position on the ball handler’s right-hand dribble. That’s something you’ll see a lot from Odom offenses are token interchanges or cuts away from the ball to distract or keep the defense occupied from the meat of the action, which is sometimes just a simple ball screen. Contrast with our Flow two years ago when Beekman was in his Senior year and we ran it quite a bit – so often we just spread the floor like this but kept that wing static. It was so predictable and just didn’t do anything to make help defenders have to think. This will be a welcome change even from Odom’s more simple offenses.

Here, you’ll see the two-man action again, but this time it gets stymied. They outlet to the wing for a potential shot, but he doesn’t pull it. Instead, the rolled big stays home and just posts up. From there, it’s a simple entry pass and the big draws a foul from a shove in the back.

Will dedicate a small section to this later, but Odom leaned on post ups a lot more at Utah St. and UMBC than he did at VCU – but that’s because he liked his matchup advantages at those places with his players and who was guarding them more than he liked his back-to-the-basket options at VCU. Another look at schematic flexibility and preference based on roster and opposition.

Here, below, is more Utah St. and more ball screen action. Ashworth cuts through to the corner again, Shulga starts out in that direction but flips it back and plays off of his screener the other way, before slipping a nice pocket pass back to him on the roll.

Here, below, they set it up with the offset side, basically clearing out a half of the floor with shooters spread around the arc on the other half.

This next one is also just an offset pick and roll on a cleared out side… but this one they’re more creative in how they get into it. Rather than set things up for the primary ball handler, you first get some interplay up top, but then the wing cuts through to the opposite side and is replaced by Ashworth (#2). He takes the pass and the Center from the opposite block now comes over and sets the ball screen to the middle of the floor, and is open on the oop on the pass back.

And then, here, you get a pick and roll up top with the big taking the switch, creating the mismatch, and diving to the block. Ashworth passes to the wing for the better passing angle, the lobbed pass in draws a collapsing defense, and the subsequent kick to the corner leads to a wide-open three.

And here they are running something else at the beginning of the play only getting into the two-man game. This play starts out as a set Odom likes where he dives two players toward one corner to create movement by the defense away from the play. That’s Zee Hamoda (#24) and Shulga (#11) starting the play by both diving down to the near-side corner. What typically happens from there is that Shulga would take the zoom-action screen (pin down from Funk, #23, into the DHO from Akin (#30) to turn the corner and drive the space vacated by he and Hamoda. We’ll see some of these actions later and they’re pretty slick when they work. Here, though, Shulga breaks it off and then uses Akin as a ball screen coming back the other way. Now they’ve changed what they were doing and switched into primary ball screens. Shulga drives it while Akin dives, but his jumper would have been hotly contested so instead he aborts and kicks it back out to the wing. Not to be deterred, they just take that positioning, Akin comes back up and sets a ball screen on the cleared out side, and this time it works to perfection where he’s left wide open under the basket for an easy dunk.

It’s a good look at how his offenses can absolutely be patient despite looking for early offense. They started in a “Blur” style corner dive into DHO action, but turned it into a ball screen look and followed that up with another ball screen attack from a different positioning. The play ended with a dunk with 5 seconds left on the shot clock after running patient offense.

Okay, pivoting back to UMBC, I was surprised to see them try to get the ball into the post in isolation more than either of the other two teams. But they just liked their options down there and their frontcourt had a little more of an advantage against their opposition than at Utah St. and VCU where it was more the guard play/mobility and skill of their PF. This one comes after stopping transition and is clearly done just to create the space on the cleared out side to post up:

Here is a very similar thing but attacking the center of the floor. You get that pick and roll again – the wing dives at an awkward time which brings his man into the play, but UMBC’s roller just seals and posts up, takes the pass and plays off of that to draw the foul.

And this one, below, is a little different but shows yet another way they can get into it multiple times. This time Dimitrije Spasojevic (#32) the 6’8″ Forward looks to seal and post early. He doesn’t get the ball and so UMBC plays 4-around-1 with Spasojevic staying low in the short corner. They pass the ball around the perimeter until they set up the formation they want and try an initial ball screen with Horvath (#12). RJ Eytle-Rock (#11 who, along with Horvath, both followed Odom to Utah St.), drives it but slips and falls, getting the ball to Spasojevic as he does. No matter, Spasojevic just kicks it back out to the wing and sets a ball screen himself, which Jacob Boonyasith (#41) uses to touch the paint, realizes the Vermont defense has sagged off, and knocks down the midrange jumper.

Finally, here’s a little pin down screen in the corner which springs the man there to clear to the opposite wing, and then clears out that side for the two-man game. I this case, the ball handler gets the ball low and then makes a nice cross-court read back to the opposite wing for the three.

This pin down action to start the set represents a different part of the offense we’ll see later, and is a nice decoy to distract from the fact that their intention is just to run a ball screen on that cleared out side. Yet another way to make it hard to read what they’re doing because there are red herrings, if you will.

You get the point. Odom’s offenses tended to use the traditional two-man pick and roll when they had a big who they liked to post up out of it – but they used it across all of their teams and got into it in a variety of different ways, different positions on the court, different player combinations, etc.

Post Up

I’m not going to spend a ton of time on this section because I didn’t really see them doing this with as much frequency at VCU or Utah St. Most of their post up game came as a result from the pick and roll. But at UMBC, they showed some different things with the design of getting the ball into the post – so he’s got that in his repertoire if he wants it. Here are a couple of quick looks at it:

In the first we see a nice little box set start off the play – a pretty a-typical formation that I didn’t see much of at his more recent stops. There’s an exchange between the players on the strong side, with Keondre Kennedy (#0) coming over and feeding it into Dan Akin (#30, who also went to Utah St. and we’ve seen many times earlier) down low. Spicy – Kennedy realizes his man’s back is turned to him focused on Akin, so he just cuts to the basket, takes the pass back, and makes the layup.

Good intention to get the ball into the post and then playing off of him as a facilitator. Just like here, below, where the whole intent of this play is to get Horvath (#12) the ball down low. He starts by cutting from the weak side wing off of a (pretty weak) screen from Akin. He posts up on the block and then works his way across the lane as the ball swings to the opposite side. As he takes the pass, notice the actions happening away from the ball to occupy the defense, but then Akin (#30) realizes that his man is deep, helping on the potential Horvath post most. As a reaction, he dives from his screening position, takes a nice pass on the cut and finishes at the rim.

Finally, a little less pretty, but this is basically the same play but this time with Spasojevic diving. He comes to the near-side block instead of even really using the Horvath screen at all – but he gets the ball on the block all the same and this time just makes a move and draws a shooting foul.

So, yeah. Horvath, Akin, and Spasojevic was a good amount of size and post skill for the American East to deal with. As such, you saw a lot more intention from Odom to call stuff for the purpose of getting them the ball on the block and letting them go to work or cutting off of them. If we’re ever in a position where we have that kind of mismatch, you better believe Odom will have some plans to put those players in similar positions.

Motion

Now we get to my favorite of his sets, which is a motion offense with movement on and away from the ball, setting up zoom screens, weaves, and misdirection to attempt to get quality looks. You’ll notice the difference primarily between the players in each corner not being stationary and the inter-weaving hand offs and replacements to get into the flow of things. Let’s jump right into the visuals:

Here is a first look at it that’s a little sloppy but gets the job done. Here we get a little ball screen into a dribble exchange with the corner, creating a switch. Shulga (#11) then takes a ball screen, but notice the strong side corner slides up and the other cuts through the baseline with Clark (#4) sliding down to the wing – all five pieces moving at the same time (as Bam dives). Shulga throws a return pass to the sliding up corner, who stumbles on receipt, continues the dribble and passes back to Shulga who has continued to slide (as has Clark). Shulga fires a quick pass to Clark in the corner who is ready to catch and launch away over a close defender.

Nothing extravagant here, but worth introducing the contrast between when primarily two-to-three guys are working off of ball screens within the offense vs. when all five pieces are in movement together. This was just some passing and return passing at the top, supported by gradual slides at the bottom which created a shot just from quick ball movement.

Alright, now this is a nifty little piece of business. You get a little dribble exchange on the near-side wing. Fermin (#21) takes the return pass back at the top of the key. Just like with their three-man and ball screen offenses, they like to use their Center as a focal point of their screening actions within this offense – but with these sets there’s more off the ball action, and actions where the ball goes to the screener to set up DHO action. That’s what happens here, Jennings (#0) runs a little wide off of it, but Fermin fakes that and looks for the real action which is the zoom screen Clark (#4) is setting up for Bamisile (#22) with the pin down screen, freeing him to take the DHO from Fermin, curl around him, while Fermin rolls into the lane. Bamisile is able to take it all the way for the finish.

This is a nice angle as it looks like a pin down to come out and set up for a three, but turns into that DHO wrap-around coming right back at the hoop. Good design.

Here’s a neat little situation where they pass it to Bam (#9) on the wing with Clark (#4) positioned opposite and Shulga heading to the opposite corner. Bam initiates a DHO with the corner while the point exchanges with Clark. The ball is passed back out to Clark and, meanwhile, Shulga (#11) has cut through the baseline and taken a pin down screen from Bam to take a rocketed right-hand pass. Shulga gives a shot fake and drives the close out, feeding a nice bounce pass to Bamgboye on the roll, and he gets fouled going up strong with the ball.

In practicality, the output of this play isn’t too different than Sides. A pin down screen on the wing taking a pass from the point and then playing some two-man action trying to exploit the recovering defense. But the window dressing to get there is much different, can go a variety of different places, and is harder to predict.

This next look starts with VCU pushing the ball out in transition and trying a probing drive prior to resetting the offense. It’s 4-out action with the Center in the short corner. Russell (#1) comes from the corner and looks like he’s going to set a back screen for Clark to flare into the corner, but instead ghosts it and flashes right to the middle of the floor where he takes the pass. He misses the midrange jumper, but I wanted to include it to show how VCU would sometimes fake these screens and cut off of them into open space.

Here’s another neat little set – and I’m actually putting it here but it could also be three-man, just offset and not how they typically run it. I suspect it doesn’t really matter, but the off players are static, but the setup is more consistent with their motion. It’s probably good that I can’t readily identify in terms of disguise – but I like this. Shulga (#11) takes the hand off from Basimile (#22), who then runs off of a flare screen from Bamgboye (#9). Bam goes to set up a return screen while Shulga dribbles with his back to the basket, but Basimile fakes the return and dives right down the lane. This would have worked, except that Bam’s man is cheating down off of him since he’s not a threat to shoot from outside. Something of note when our Center isn’t. Shulga exploits this spacing, though, as he passes the ball right back to Bam and runs off of him with a DHO that sets up a nice open three-pointer.

Shulga may not make this shot – but that’s a really nice look and created by his reaction to New Mexico’s defense of the Basimile dive to the rim. Good reading and reacting.

This next, action is another cool pin down that’s a variant. Initially there’s a pass to the wing, but this time they fake the dribble exchange and Terrence Hill Jr. (#6) cuts to the free throw line and then back out the other side to the opposite wing. The ball reverses through Bam back to Hill. Meanwhile, Shulga sets a (moving) cross screen to free up the post as an option on the block. Hill could have thrown this pass, and certainly VCU would have if that was a preferred matchup, but instead he waits for Shulga to dart up past the pin down screen from Bam to get a nice straight-away look from deep.

There’s the afore mentioned pass into the post there if you like that matchup. Shulga could have also curled around the Bam screen and dove to the hoop coming around it. Nice options here.

Okay, now let’s shuffle over to how Utah St. incorporated this. We start with a series of fakery – DHO actions at the point up front with both Ashworth (#3) and their 6’8″ SF Sean Bairstow (#2) as potential initiators. Ashworth runs with it into a dribble exchange on the nearside wing as Bairstow screens away up top. There’s a wraparound action as Funk (#23) shows off of that screen and then curls into the lane behind Akin (#30). Meanwhile Eytle-Rock (#5) brings the ball over and exchanges with Bairstow again who now has Akin (#30) creeping up to represent the zoom screen action. New Mexico overplays it in anticipation, and Bairstow sees that, rejects the screen, and exploits the driving lane (after the brief dribble hesitation) for the finish.

Notice also the screens away on the bottom of the screen as the Bairstow drive materializes to occupy defenders. This kind of set looks as smooth as butter when it comes together; players interweaving with each other while setting up key transition points and reading how the defense is reacting to all of it. Silky.

Here’s a more traditional zoom screen action, below, where Shulga passes to the opposite wing, takes a back screen, and cuts through to the corner. This frees up Funk (#23) to pass back to Akin (#30) and for Eytle-Rock (#5) to then take the zoom action; coming from the corner to take the ball screen action from Funk into the DHO from Akin to get all the way to the hoop, drawing the foul.

This next one is a horribly blown layup, but a sweet set. We’ve got Funk (#23) taking the initial pass and then exchanging with Eytle-Rock (#5) as Ashworth (#3) takes the back screen from Akin (#30). Eytle-Rock whips it back out to Akin who reverses to Shulga. Ashworth now sets a back screen for Eytle-Rock, sets up a stagger screen with Akin for Funk, and then goes to represent using another screen from Akin. As Funk takes the pass at the point, Ashworth breaks off his route to dive toward the open hoop, takes a pass for a wide-open layup (which he blows).

There’s just a lot that could have happened out of this set, depending on what came open; but it was a really intuitive cut from Ashworth to finish off all of the Pulk/Pulling of the defense.

Here’s one where there’s a pass to the wing and then a flip back to the original ball handler. He pressures the wing on the bounce, but takes a ball screen back the other direction and the roll is wide open.

Really, I could have put that set into two-man as well, but all of the noise ahead of time to get them into that look was what threw off the defense.

This next one is one of my favorites. There’s a pass to the wing and exchange with an immediate pass back out to the point. Funk (#23) cuts across like we saw a bunch in the three-man section above, and the pass goes into Bairstow at the three-point line with his back to the basket. Of note, here’s a 6’8″ guy who can handle a little but can also be used like this with his frame as a passer. This time, instead of moving to the wing for a pass as we so often saw, Funk rapidly accelerates past a back door screen from Akin. Bairstow could throw this pass if it was open but SDST reacts well to it with their help defense. Undeterred, and ball still with Bairstow, Ashworth takes a flare screen from Akin. I think Bairstow could have thrown this one, but instead he drops it off to Akin and sets a zoom screen for Shulga, coming off of his pin down and taking the DHO around Akin. As SDST reacts to that, Akin dives to the lane to receive a nice anticipatory pass for the foul at the rim.

That’s just such a well-coordinated set that’s hard to defend throughout because the pressure never stops. You’ve got a back door cut, into a flare, into a zoom action, into a roll to the hoop, all in quick succession.

The last two looks we’ll get from the Aggies are close confusers. We get that dribble exchange but Bairstow doesn’t really utilize Akin’s screen – it’s more for show. Instead, Akin (#30) goes right into the pin down for Ashworth (#3) and seals his man while Ashworth delivers a pretty lob pass for a clear path to the hoop. Note, also, the exchange up top to occupy defenders.

That’s basically like half of sides with a different set up, but the same neat little pin down action to free a guard on half of the floor. It’s dabbling in it. We don’t have to invest the entire offense in it; but we can do it a little, you know?

And then, the variation done shortly after; it’s the same exact setup only this time, Ashworth curls around the pin down and takes the ball right to the bucket.

Good layering of play; setting expectations for one thing and then deviating.

Alright – one quick look at UMBC just to show they were doing it as well. Here, you’ve got them resetting the offense after a break push, thinking they’re going to use a ball screen at first, and then using a series of passes, weaves, and ball screens to keep the defense scrambling, before passing it to their big in the high post for an open jumper. If you check out the actions beforehand, his man is sagging deeper to cover a pass to a man cutting under the hoop and being ready to help on a potential post pass; just losing touch with his man.

We’re going to see more in a bit of how they string all of these looks together and play off of them.

Isolation/Drive and Kick

This is the glue that ties all of it together and fills in the cracks of all of the other designs. We saw more of from VCU; but was still there across the board. The majority of the time, I’m going to always prefer ball screen offense to isolation/one-on-one/drive-and-kick style offenses. But the beauty of having a good number of plus athletes and playmakers and having so many screen/motion actions built into what you do, is that you can catch your opponents by surprise when you simply attack them straight-up off of the bounce. Incorporating that into everything else makes it even more effective. If I’m a defender, I always have to be on my toes if I could have a ball screen set on me but my man may also just try to take me without one.

There are some sets where this was the design, but most of the time, this came after they tried or at least set up something else – like 3-man, ball screen, or motion offense. They’d show that (or legitimately try it) and the option was there for players to just beat their man off the bounce and drive/kick integrated into those other things we just saw. It happened most at the end of shot clocks, but was integrated throughout where sometimes guys would just go to it early and everyone else would see it and, in turn, play off of it.

For example, here VCU is trying to run motion into a pick and roll and when neither work, they move into isolation. Zeb Jackson (#2) threatens at first, then passes to Bamisile (#22) who catches it with momentum and beats his man into the paint with a nice finish over help. Do notice that when they get to this point of isolation, Bamgboye (#9) stays low, working to proactively box out his defender so as to get an offensive rebound once his teammates get a shot up. That’s by design.

Here, you see the offense get stymied a few times. First they try a pin down for Shulga, then a ball screen… eventually they just let Shulga take his man into the lane and look for the kick out for three.

Here, below, you get a little motion setup early, into that little stagger screen action across the free throw line, and when none of that works, Shulga just decides he’s going to isolate his man and rain in that step back three.

Here, you’ve got a nice look at the progression. You’ve got the motion offense setting up three-man. Shulga gets the ball deep into the paint and dumps it off to his big, but the Lobos are in good position. When this stalls out, the kick it back out to Clark (#4) their PF on the wing and he isolates his man, driving baseline, looking to pull it out prior to driving deeper and finding the kick out from under the hoop for the and-1 three.

Here, below, we see a greater portion of the drive and kick offense within the possession. There’s a token attempt to ball screen early, and then again, but then they just swing the ball around the horn, attack a mismatch, draw two under the hoop, kick it out, attack the subsequent close out, then draw a shooting foul.

This one was basically a full set of the drive and kick and you see the simplicity of it but effectiveness when you have the players; get into the lane and force the defense to react, then look for the open man, then attack the scramble… and keep doing that until you generate enough advantage for a shot or a finish/foul.

Here’s a little variation they call “Catfish” where they just quickly throw it to the corner to catch the opposition off guard and attack in isolation from there. This plays off of the corners being relatively static in most of their sets; so running some offense but then snapping it off really quickly with that corner pass and drive disrupts the standard flow and adds to the surprise.

Here’s another look at a full set of isolation when they commit to it fully – and they’ll do it more often depending on the matchup and expect to see it more often with a team full of playmaking guards like VCU compared to a team full of shooters like Utah St. Drive, stop look for the back door cut. It’s not there? Hand off the curl, drive the lane draw the defense. Defense collapses? Kick back out, attack again (and this time Shulga gets the turnaround jumper in the lane).

Drive and kick. Drive and kick. Drive and kick.

But Utah St. still used this to fill in the gaps of the offense. For example, here the ball screen creates an advantage, but the continuation of that is kicking to the wing, having Bairstow (#2) drive the advantage again, and kick back out to Ashworth (#3) for the now wide-open three.

Here, we’ll see UMBC with a styling of it. They keep their big low, set up a ball screen after the offense stalls out, which generates the guard/big switch. Identifying this, Rogers (#2) passes away and gets the ball right back, this time attacking his man in isolation, drawing the help, and dishing for the foul.

Very intentional about setting up that switch and by having a finisher roaming low to support the smaller Rogers – but still isolation at the end of the day.

Sometimes, these looks lead to Odom’s guys taking difficult shots that we historically haven’t encouraged under the CTB regime for the past 15 years – and not always at the very end of shot clocks in desperation (we had plenty of those over the years).

Shots like this step-back, contested, three late in a game:

But, with that, sometimes it’s going to be too aggressive over too tight of a contest:

And sometimes it’s going to just look ugly:

What I will say is – brace yourself – there’s going to be some whiplash from what we’re used to. This is all part of the design. The early shots, the occasional isolation leading to contested or difficult threes. Odom tries to empower his guys to make a play – to shoot it when it’s open – to hunt a shot when they need to without overthinking it.

They won’t always find the right balance and may be over-aggressive at times, but hopefully you’ve seen that they aren’t just playing iso-ball and jacking up threes. They’re actually quite patient and run quality offensive sets when the early offense isn’t there. His teams share the ball very well and have had high assist rates across all three iterations. It’s important to remember that the majority of the time, this isolation basketball is connecting the dots between different offensive concepts; giving them options throughout a possession and always making them feel like they can just go and make a play if they need to.

And when it all comes together, you get offensive sets that transition between concepts and react seamlessly to what the defense is showing them to act as one comprehensive offensive system.

Putting It All Together

Looks like this – two-man, into motion, into drive and kick for the open three:

Three-man, into motion, into two-man:

Or this end-of-half play with some three-man screening action, into isolation, leading to offensive rebound crashing with Bam tipping it to Shulga for the finish:

The offensive looks above have shown a good amount of blending – but I thought these were good examples of the blending between styles and how the isolation/drive and kick element fills in the gaps when something stalls or they’re looking for an idea.

Speaking of that last clip, though, there’s one more offensive element on which I haven’t yet touched that I should….

Offensive Rebounding

I wouldn’t call Odom’s teams incredible offensive rebounding teams; but they do crash the glass hard, often sending 3-4 guys to attack the shot. They’ll do this anticipatorily as a play winds down, sending their big down low for positioning and proactive sealing/jockeying for position; but they’ll also just crash from the perimeter too. The chaos with which they like to play isn’t afraid of teams running the other way on them.

Now, this hasn’t always been a strength of Odom teams – but they peaked at 10th in the nation at collecting 36.1% of shot attempts on the offensive end this past season. That’s certainly in part based on the athleticism of his players, and also the long rebounds from so many outside shots, outside shots in transition, and being more prepared for when your guys are going to shoot than the opposition. That being said, a lot of it was just hustle and grind, too.

I’m not going to go over the top on this piece with a bunch of offensive rebounding clips – but here are two that stood out and should give a sense of the level of effort within the system we’re discussing:

Here we see them run through their offense, keep a missed shot alive, and Bamisile (#22) almost takes out the ref diving out of bounds to save the ball that Fermin tips back. He gets BACK into the play to sky for the board on another miss from the corner to put back the easy layup.

That’s just incredible effort, prioritizing the ability to keep the ball on a miss, sacrificing the body to do so, and still sticking with the play.

And this last one is just… chef’s kiss. VCU takes four threes on this possession. Three different players grab an offensive board (and you see the combo of isolation and pick and roll action leading to these threes) and the fourth is pure.

You want to know a big reason VCU’s pace was slower than expected last year? Sure, it was some of the patient sets you saw earlier, but it was also that this counts as one possession by most data analytics sites. This should be four different possessions – instead it’s one long one. Being the 10th best offensive rebounding team in the country with that criteria will draw out some of your possessions.

In Conclusion

Now you have the context, because there are a lot of different things said about Ryan Odom’s offensive system, many of which are counter-intuitive or misleading. I most commonly hear it referred to as a 4-out drive-and-kick offense. But really, it’s its own thing with 4 and 5-out looks, classic and three-man ball screen elements, post sets, a whole playbook of motion sets and, yes, some drive and kick elements to glue it all together.

You’ll hear that they play really fast while at the same time hearing, “if they play so fast, why isn’t their pace faster!” Now you know the answer. They do play fast and aggressively look for early offense and shots – but when those looks aren’t there, they can be very patient running their base offense.

There are going to be many times this year, especially among our fan base, where fans complain about the shot selection and that we’re “just” running isolation offense. But you now know that’s part of the plan and baked into a full offensive strategy while being just one small part of a broader offensive system. Basically, you’ve got to break some eggs and let them shoot sometimes – and sometimes that is going to be the wrong decision. It’s factored into the calculus to empower all of the positive plays that stem from freedom and confidence.

I’m very excited to see it in action this year and how our newly assembled roster (still TBD) puts it together – but, in my opinion, it’s going to be a completely different vibe and one I welcome. A modernization, if you will, around analytics and shot-selection, while also running some offense that should be attention-grabbing in its aesthetics (and some that’s going to look clunky like we’re just jacking up shots and/or being careless with the ball).

What I’m most excited about in all of this, is knowing that Odom is going to keep the broad design the same, but is going to select from all of the different pieces that can go into it based on the skillset of his roster compared to what his opposition is doing. No longer are we going to do something (or not do something) just because that’s “how we do things.” We’re going to tailor what we do to what we’re good at specifically as it relates to what our opposition will most struggle with. Matchup hunting. Systemic intention. Customization. But, always, early offense if you can get it.

I’m very much looking forward to seeing what, from all of it, he carries into his first iteration in Charlottesville against ACC competition.

Alright – that’s my capture on Odom’s offensive philosophy and many of his system intricacies. In my next piece, I’ll focus on his defensive systems and differences across his programs. Once that’s done, I’ll start tackling a very robust transfer portal.

Until next time, thanks for reading!