Cuts From The Defensive Playbook: Ryan Odom’s System

We’re back with the second of our two installments of Ryan Odom’s systems. The first was our look at his offenses. This will be a look at his defensive systems. While still meaty, this will be the shorter of the two pieces as there aren’t quite as many nuances to get through. But, notably, both the efficacy and aggression with which his teams defended corresponded to his talent and athleticism on that side of the ball. Namely, he was able to ratchet up the pressure with VCU and add more wrinkles to attack, where Utah St. played the most vanilla of his rosters. Just like with his offenses, his system was based in the same principles across his teams; but he altered the points of emphasis within depending on his horses.

I will say that, while the VCU team won with defense vs. the Utah St. team that won with offense, it wasn’t overwhelming complexity on that side of the ball that lead to it – certainly more wrinkles within the offensive sets. But VCU carried the day with athletic talent, tons of effort and toughness, and sharp rotations/aggressive help. So, compared to an Aggies squad that tried to play more in front of the ball, help and contest; at times pretty poorly, it was great to see the most recent Odom-coached team bring that kind of intensity. VCU was the kind of team that could impose its will – that wore the referees down to swallowing their whistles because of their constant physicality setting the tone for how the game would be played.

So, let’s go ahead and jump right into what his teams did.

Full-Court Pressure

This was probably the most visible difference – VCU often picked up with full court pressure almost the entire game, all game long. Utah St., on the other hand, almost never pressured full court except for when down late in games. UMBC did on occasion, but much closer to Utah State’s rate than VCUs. So, it was with the Rams that Odom cut loose because he had the players and depth to do it.

Most of their pressure and most of Odom’s pressure was straight-forward man; allowing the opposition to catch the ball and then badgering them up the court, perhaps with a teammate lurking in case the ball defender got beaten.

This first look is just that, and it’s after the first made basket of the game with the Rams pressuring Mason from the tip. Notice that Max Shulga (#11) allows the catch and simply applies pressure up the floor, with Jack Clark (#4) lurking with his man.

This isn’t overly aggressive here, but it does force GMU to work and it keeps them from getting into their offense until there’s about 20-22 seconds left on the shot clock.

Here’s a similar but different look where the pressure was still pretty light and mostly designed just to make CSU work. They’re not pressuring up to get steals here, but they are double-teaming the ball and forcing Colorado State to reverse court and work their way up. They trap twice here and there’s probably an opportunity to make a play at a steal if their offside defense was trying for the play. Instead, CSU barely crosses halfcourt with about 2 seconds to spare.

Those were representative of the majority of VCU defensive possessions after made baskets. Not overly aggressive, but full court pressure with the design of making the opposition work to wear them down. They did it consistently after most makes; but they would also sprinkle in wrinkles from time to time, even not in end-game scenarios to get more aggressive.

Here’s a look against New Mexico where, this time, they don’t put a man on the inbounder and instead use that man to pressure the ball. VCU fronts here, with Shulga’s man beating him to the ball to take the pass, but with the Rams looking to set the trap there, the Lobos instead throw the long pass over the top of the front by Terrence Hill Jr. (#6). This almost allows a steal by the help from Bamisile (#22), but New Mexico is lucky to gather the carom. Once they gather themselves, having beaten the initial pressure, though, VCU settles right back into it’s man-to-man pressure and Shulga simply matches up on the ball handler and hassles him across midcourt.

This starts to have a cumulative effect as VCU would always make you work to cross the timeline, but would mix in different looks to catch you off guard. The effect was a feeling of chaos (and remember, this is supplemented by their desire to push in transition as often as possible on offense).

A little more aggressive there, and here’s a look at them mixing it up. It starts out like a normal look with a solitary man pressuring the ball, but then Christian Fermin (#21) aggressively springs a trap when his man runs by the ball handler. Unlike two plays above, this isn’t a token trap, they’re trying for a steal here, and look at how CSU is caught off guard, because most possessions VCU was just pressuring straight up man-to-man. CSU outlets to their big who Fermin was guarding, who is not great for beating pressure like this. He gets sped up when Bamisile steps up and jumps at the pass fake, and starts dribbling at the hoop. Fermin is fast enough to recover and Shulga is there near the hoop, setting another trap and forcing a travel on the sped up big (and if he hadn’t travelled, it would have been a steal).

That’s just really smart basketball, showing a look regularly and then throwing a wrinkle off of it designed to either get a steal or force a player who is uncomfortable handling the ball to handle the ball.

Here they are putting a man on the inbounder and aggressively denying the inbound pass across the board. You see all five players in the screen on this one at different times, and the 6’10” Jack Clark is actually the one who gets the steal and passes it back out to his teammate (a foul is called on CSU before the shot counts – but you can see them quickly trying to turn defense into offense).

Contrastingly, you only saw Utah St. press in normal, standard, pressing situations, like down three with under a minute to play, here. It’s a similar situation where they fronted the inbound pass and contested on the catch (here deflecting the ball and forcing a turnover).

But, here below, you can kind of see why – they just weren’t as good at it. They’re trying to deny the ball but just get beaten from distance running back to it, they struggle to find an angle on the initial trap and kind of sag into no man’s land, and when the trap does eventually come, the rotation to the pass back under the hoop is very slow as is the close out on the ball, which is also sloppy, out of control, and fouls in the process.

You’re going to see a theme throughout in this piece, with the halfcourt defense as well, that Utah St. had a lot of the same stuff in their arsenal that VCU did, but they just either didn’t use it much, or used a much more vanilla version of it due to a lack of a similar athletic ability. That stemmed in part from the people pressuring the ball handlers, but also from the bigs ability to protect the rim and recover.

With VCU, Odom was very proactive with these pressures and with Utah State, he was very reactive (UMBC was more of a hybrid where they did pressure some throughout the game but much more inconsistently and usually the vanilla ball pressure).

It wasn’t all sunshine for the Rams, though, as the pressure sometimes cut the other way due to over-aggression and sloppy recovery.

Here, below, you see them decide to try to jump the ball handler after a rebound (the set pressures were always after made baskets but sometimes you’d see them try to make a play after a missed shot as well). It’s a really good start, as the pressure from the side stops the fast break and forces the GMU guard to turn his back to the play, not looking for the outlet pass nor being able to dribble it up himself. But the problem is he’s over-aggressive. Rather than taking the win of shutting down the break and backing out, he attempts to jump and deflect the outlet pass, running himself behind the play and starting a de facto 5-on-4 fast break the other way that didn’t need to be. Mason pushes the ball up the floor, VCU miscommunicates who is going to pick up the ball to cover for the mistake, and the Patriots get a wide-open three on the wing as a result.

It’s a complete unforced error that came from just getting too cute and trying to make too much happen after a productive initial effort.

And here’s one more look, below, where they attempt to spring the trap in the back court with Fermin (#21) again, but this time CSU lobs the ball over to a big who is a more sure ball handler, and no one else steps in to pick him up; allowing a fully uncontested three-quarter-court drive for the uncontested layup.

It reminds me a bit of turnovers on the fast break or poor shot selection from the offense. These are the kinds of mistakes that are going to come from playing so fast and trying to create so much chaos. Sometimes you’re the one who gets burned from it and it’s going to look ugly when it happens. That being said, this is something Odom turns on and off like a faucet. He’s only going to do it aggressively when he’s convinced that the net aggregate favors his team and he’ll only break it out in standard situations, or just to mix in a change-of-pace, when he doesn’t have the roster for it.

I’ll be interested to see where he thinks our roster this coming season falls on that spectrum once it’s all put together.

Half-Court Defense

So, after pressuring above or, in many cases, just getting back after a miss (and contesting for that offensive rebound) Odom’s teams mostly settled into man-to-man. Occasionally, they would mix in a zone (and we’ll look at that later), but almost never as a primary option; more so either as a change-of-pace to mix up looks briefly, or in response to struggling to defend the opposition. He did that across all of his squads but more frequently with Utah St. as they faced more struggles defending.

Let’s go ahead and jump right into his most common defensive sets.

Man-To-Man

Just like his full court pressure above, his man-to-man defenses were based off of the same core concepts across his teams but were a lot more exotic with the ability for defenders to freelance at VCU than at the other schools. You saw the Rams more aggressive in passing lanes, with their help and more willing to add wrinkles to their coverages, where the Aggies mostly just tried to stay in front of their man, play straight up, and force misses.

Odom clearly prefers having more options and weapons at his disposal, but plays with what he’s given. He didn’t look to complicate matters or make things harder on his less talented defensive rosters. While we will break down some of the variances within the defense, at the core concepts were a few things:

1.) When defending ball screens, the ball defender typically chases his man over the top of the screen, while the post defender plays deep drop coverage in the lane, being available to help on the ball handler if his teammate can’t get back into the play while also looking to recover to the screener. This was basically universal across his programs except for in rare circumstances or if the screen was far enough away from the basket that the ball defender could just slip under.

2.) Defenders pressured the ball on the catch and then played tight, straight up, man defense. At VCU, you’d see them be more aggressive in passing lanes trying to create turnovers, where Utah State was more about just trying to stay in front and force contested shots.

3.) Guards typically switched off ball screens, but the more confidence Odom had in his bigs defense, sometimes he’d have bigs switch those as well (more commonly with someone like Jack Clark from the PF at VCU).

4.) Sometimes his teams would send double teams to the post, both from the near and off-side (guards and bigs), but most of the time his post defenders played straight up when their opponent caught the ball inside. They also weren’t normally overly aggressive about fronting or denying that pass into the post.

5.) Help-side defense was variable; but tended to be more forthcoming and aggressive from VCU because of the athleticism of the guards and the confidence in the frontcourt to help and protect the rim. UMBC and, especially, Utah St. were less willing to take chances getting into a play from the offside.

So, from here, I’m just going to start showing examples and talking through all of this (including variations), beginning with his most successful and complex defense in VCU.

VCU

Here you see the beginning of the possession with the standard, straight-up variant on the ball pressure up the floor. GMU actually crosses halfcourt with under a second remaining. You can see VCU playing pretty aggressively on the catch here, up on their man closely, looking for steal opportunities. Notably, Jack Clark (#4) proactively switches on a screen away from the ball, putting him on a guard. At 6’10” but with mobility, Clark’s versatility gave Odom some defensive options. The most consistent element across Odom defenses is that they typically played drop coverage when defending the pick and roll, and you’ll see this here as Clark, now on GMU’s 6’4″ Brayden O’Connell, chases around the screen. Luke Bamgboye (#9) is VCU’s 6’10” rim-protecting Center, and he drops, now, staying ahead of the rolling big. As Clark is chasing the play, he funnels O’Connell into Bamgboye and then leaves off of him, sliding over to box out Mason’s Jalen Haynes (who runs 6’8″ 260lbs!). Bam’s shot block attempt dramatically alters the shot, and Clark is there to grab the rebound and (bonus footage), push the break the other way for the quick three-point attempt (which misses).

There’s a lot to digest from that one. Firstly, the pressure full court is there, illustrating again their most common defensive look to start a possession. Notably, though, there’s huge value in having two lengthy and mobile defenders 4-5. Clark was able to switch onto a guard with no fear, quickly work his way back into the play after getting caught far out on a screen, and get back into good rebounding position. Bamgboye, conversely, did a good job of dropping to shut down a return pass to Haynes and being in good position (and with good spring) to contest O’Connell’s layup attempt. Clark’s rotation was both savvy and was paid off by him securing the rebound. As a call back to the early offense section of my previous piece, we get a look at them taking this opportunity and pushing it the other way at breakneck speed. While they don’t convert, you get a good sense of the high pressure they’re consistently putting on their opposition.

In this next look you see the tail end of GMU trying to run out after a break but Zeb Jackson (#2) doing a nice job of shutting down the runout in the backcourt without taking himself out of the play. That slows the break opportunity and forces Mason to set up offense. You then see them navigate all of the ball screens the same way: be there on the catch, get over the screen, defender drops. At the end, Shulga (#11) does a decent job of fighting over a screen but still can’t stay in front of his defender, but you see both Bamgboye (#9) and Clark (#4) both in good position to contest the shot, with Bam swatting it out of bounds.

That play illustrates three things pretty well – how Odom’s teams almost always defend the ball screen (you’ll see it a bunch in here) by dropping back into the lane. The awareness/eyes on the ball not just for Bamgboye to support the pick and roll, but from Clark to gain depth and help off his man, and the value of having at least one (but better when multiple) mobile rim protectors within his defense. Those points all play off of each other, but primarily the latter point supporting the first as Odom’s scheme frequently asks that big to defend two while the guard chases.

This is a more suffocating but similar set, below. It’s the same core defensive look with guards proactively switching off ball screens. This time the ball defender does break off and go under the ball screen because it’s out by the logo, but notice Bamgboye down well under the three-point line just in case the defender isn’t able to recover. GMU attempts to curl another player around an off ball screen from Haynes (#11), which would work, but Bam is there in the lane to deter the drive again. As GMU recovers, notice how Phillip Russell (#1) pinches down from his man (who is too deep to be in the play) to help pressure GMU’s ball handler to funnel him back away from the lane. GMU attempts to retreat and use the ball screen again to attack the other side, but Bamgboye is there to cut off the driving lane again and this time Shulga reaches in and pokes the ball away, resulting in a scramble. The broken play causes Bamgboye to fall and GMU to get a pass behind the defense, but Jack Clark’s (#4) secondary rim protection swoops back and suffocates the shot.

I’ve mentioned this before, but this is a great example of how VCU ran the same system differently. They’re still playing ball screens the same way, but their men closest to the ball are willing to take more chances to help off their man, clog driving lanes, and attempt to get their hands on the ball. All of this is because they, themselves, are quick to the ball and to recover, but also because they feel confident in the help behind them. If not Bamgboye here, Clark is there to block the shot when things break down. Odom’s defense will be ideally suited if we can play two rim protectors in the front court – but at least having one will be essential to allow for any real wrinkles.

Here’s a good look at them aggressively pressuring passes and trying to get their hands on the ball for deflections; in this case, deflecting the ball into the back court, trying to chase it down, pressuring man-to-man as CSU crosses midcourt a second time, then a big-to-guard switch where the big takes the cutter, leaving Russell (#1) on the big high, sealed by them closing with not switching the ball screen and Bamisile (#22) staying in the play to contest the shot in the lane and secure the rebound.

This next possession gives a good look into the guard defensive strategy at VCU and the ability to react to what’s happening during the play. Russell (#1) slips under the DHO early and gives a little space, but eventually creeps up on his man all the way out to the logo. Shulga almost makes a play on the pass to the wing, but then recovers to cut off the drive. As his man cuts through the paint and kicks the pass out to the other side, Jennings proactively switches onto Jared Billups (#1) for GMU, noticing that the play was coming his way and that he was in good position to cut off the driving angle. This switch at the end of the shot clock allows him to be right there and to give an incredibly intrusive contest on the jumper as opposed to if Bamisile (#22) had needed to stay with the play (his recovery angle was much deeper in the lane). Fermin (#21) boxes out and Clark (#4) swoops down to secure the defensive board.

Generally speaking, this is just quality straight-up man defense with VCUs defenders playing free. But I like the communication on the near-side wing as the play winded down as the switch despite not navigating a screen showed awareness of the play development, good communication between the players, and the freedom within the system to do that. And the result was an incredibly well-contested jumper vs. likely a pull up with a cushion (or even the ability for Billups to turn the corner) if Russell had just gone through the motions and stuck with his cover.

Alright, now let’s look at a few more elements off of the ball. Here you see GMU initiating their offense after taking some time to get the ball across half court. They run a few dribble exchanges and VCU alternates going under and over the screen, staying close to the ball handler without overly pressing. The first real action is from a pin down screen where Mason could attempt to curl into the lane on the catch at the wing. If you pause at 7 seconds into the clip, you can see a triangle of VCU defenders around the ball on the catch. There’s Shulga (#11) chasing over top, Fermin (#21) moved up to the free throw line to deter the drive to the middle, and Zeb Jackson (#2) pinching in, leaning low, to also deter a dribble toward the advantage. It happens in a split second, but the Rams are able to recover from there straight into man-to-man due to the team awareness and help without having to get out of position to do so. Just a deterrent. But this next part is, to me, the most interesting systemically. Mason drives the ball toward the corner/baseline, getting Shulga slightly out of position as he was previously chasing. At 9 seconds into the clip, notice how Fermin is near his man, but moves away in positioning, prepared to help and cut off that baseline drive should it materialize. Also note Jack Clark (#4) on the back side fully under the hoop and pinched in to deter any shenanigans to Haynes (#11 on Mason). The back side defender plays center field in case of a skip pass, but VCU is just comfortable sagging this far off to clog the middle. It’s a rotation you might be used to seeing from us when double teaming the post – but this isn’t a post double, it’s a pre-emptive deterrent in response to a guard drive. Mason thinks better of it and ends up taking a poor, contested, shot from outside and Clark crashes from the weak side to secure the glass.

I really like that set. Part of it is possible because Clark is so long and mobile. They just weren’t worried about a cross-court pass; feeling confident that they could recover. But I appreciated how aware and responsive their team defense was to a drive that wasn’t even that clearly advantaged. They threw both of their 6’10” guys into the lane to muck things up before the ball even got there, and the result was that GMU didn’t even try. That rotation with bigs is one you’d see pretty consistently across teams.

Here’s one where they give up a bucket, but it shows some more options and it’s still a solid possession. GMU is running a three-man game up top with Haynes (#11) screening for the ball and diving while Zach Anderson (#10) slips the stagger screen and pops out. VCU defends this by leaving Bamgboye in the lane off of Haynes, and then trying to have their ball defender chase under the screens. Yet, when he can’t, Jack Clark (#4), their 6’10” PF picks up the mantle. With the ball at the point, you’ll see Bamgboye fighting hard to play over the top of Haynes; denying an entry pass. When the ball reverses to the top wing, though, Bam plays behind Haynes on the block, straight up. Before we get there, though, notice how VCU does get slipped up on the guard-to-guard slip screen, both staying with the ball, but how Jack Clark, now weak side, kind of moseys back into the play, making the pass to the guard under the hoop unprofitable. Instead, the pass goes into Haynes in the post, who attempts to make a move baseline. Bam cuts him off and sends him behind the backboard, and Bamisile (#22) doubles down from the near-side wing. This causes Haynes to actually stumble and fall down while rolling a pass back out to the wing, and Bamisile has solid recovery, starting to run back out ahead of the ball, but the shot-making by Mason over the quality contest is too good here.

It’s worth calling out on that play that the proactive switch guard-to-big from Clark early in the possession came back to haunt them as Bamisile was attempting to close out on a 6’7″ player. That being said, it’s still a good contest, I like the switching with positional flexibility, I like how Clark wasn’t even especially alert but how his presence would have been helpful on help side, and I like how they sent the near-side guard down to help double the post.

They would also trap post-to-post sometimes. In this next play, below, you see Bamgboye (#9) allowing the catch again to Haynes, who is an absolute load down there. This time Clark (#4) slides over from the baseline side to initiate the trap, leaving Bamisile as the help side defender, guarding two. One man cuts through the lane, coming over to Haynes, causing Bamisile to have to take him, and then leaving Zeb Jackson (#2) as the help side defender (pause at 9 seconds to see this). GMU does a good job of resetting only to go right back to it, and this time Haynes is able to make a move before the Rams can send help.

In recent seasons, UVa (especially under Coach Sanchez) reduced the amount of post doubles they’d send. Historically, though, they would always come post-to-post. I do like that VCU under Odom was willing to send them from any position to keep the opposition guessing (even if it didn’t work in either of these clips).

Here’s another look against New Mexico where they successfully sag Fermin (#21) on a ball screen and the guard recovers, chasing Donovan Dent (#2) down to get back into the play, only to have the post entry pass take place. This time, Brandon Jennings who is sagging off of his man from the corner is there to double team when the Center turns the ball into the paint. Note Russell (#1) sprinting back from his wing position to attempt to get back to the cutter from the corner. The sudden rotations combined with the active hands on the trap force a bad kick off pass and a turnover.

And then check out this wrinkle where, against Colorado St., VCU proactively switches a guard-to-guard screen on a cleared-out wing. This leaves the 6’4″ Brandon Jennings (#0) on the 6’6″ Nique Clifford (#10) for CSU, though. Recognizing the attempt to exploit the matchup in the post, now VCU’s Center, Fermin (#21) comes over to double team the guard post up, Russell (#1) at 6’0″ dives into the paint to disrupt the cut from CSU’s abandoned 6’7″ Rashaan Mbemba (#21), fronting him. This prompts CSU to attempt the cross-court pass which the roaming and active Bamisile (#22) deflects out of bounds.

Put a lot of these rotations together, and you get some complete defensive possessions like these, with a good combination of pressure and team help/awareness:

Check out this shot clock violation forced through being aggressive on the catch/trying to deny passes on the perimeter. When the ball gets into the post at about 16 seconds into the clip, notice Jennings (#1) doing a nice job fronting the cutter, and all of he, Shulga, and Bamgboye have at least one foot on the restricted area while Clark defends the ball. There’s just nowhere to go. Jaylen Crocker-Johnson (#8) from GMU drives the lane and Shulga starts to recover out to the wing, so he sends the pass to the opposite corner. Jennings, who was helping to keep the lane congested, is slower to recover, but Shulga alters his rotation down to close out. As he does so, Zeb Jackson (#2) recognizes the shift and rotates over to deter the shot from the kick out to Nique Clifford (#10). Clifford attempts to dribble by the close out to take the pull up jumper, but Shulga has rotated back into the play and actually gets his hand on the jumper, forcing Clifford to eat the shot clock violation.

It’s just smart positioning, good recognition, and even better motor – they didn’t give up on the play or settle for allowing a teammate to handle it.

One more look, below. Once again, VCU is flying around the ball and trying to gum up the middle. Notice the Fermin (#21) sag on the cutter who tries to back door off of a screen, and then being in good position to help on the drive from another man wrapping around an off ball screen. His alertness and depth shut down two different opportunities. As the ball swings back out to his man and CSU sets up another ball screen, which they reject, if you pause at 11 seconds into the clip, you’ll see VCU actually has three different players converge on the ball/drive, with enough congestion to cause a poor pass out of the pressure to secure the steal.

At their best, VCU was physical across the board (but especially on the perimeter), pressuring the catch, contesting passing lanes, cheating toward the middle of the floor when the ball was in precarious positions, and flying to the ball in their recoveries without hesitation. This allowed them to be stingy on this end of the floor while also creating opportunities to get out in transition.

—————————————————————————-

One key vulnerability of this defensive system, and something they were pretty willing to accept because it’s a lower percentage shot, is the midrange jumper. When the center drops and the guard chases over the top of the ball screen, the opposing team’s ball handler has the opportunity to take the pull up midrange jumper, like here:

Sometimes they’d get someone in a little too deep and could force and awkward runner over a contest, like this one against Donovan Dent:

But this shot, below, which Dent misses but New Mexico offensive rebounds, is usually there (notice also the sagging into the lane when the ball is on the baseline, although it doesn’t matter here because they still score).

In fact, high quality, scoring PGs give this drop strategy all kinds of issues, as we saw from Donovan Dent against both VCU (and we’ll see against Utah St. later). The reason being, it gives great players space and breathing room – and great players can normally take advantage of space; punishing if they decide to try to go under the screen by taking the outside shot:

Or, in this case, just beating the sagged defense to the angle and driving past it (and many other ways):

Donovan Dent for New Mexico was a great case study for what Ryan Odom turned to if an opposing lead guard starts taking over against the drop coverage. These next few looks, below, were atypical. They were responses (while still playing Man) to struggling to defend the ball screen and/or in anticipation of an especially tough matchup.

So, in this situation, they would try hedging sometimes. Here you see a HARD hedge by Fermin (#21) when Dent from UNM takes the DHO. The problem is that they didn’t just hedge, the lingered. Here you see Fermin doesn’t really recover, and they double team the ball but without making it an intrusive one. This puts the help defense in a rough spot because they’re having to cover 3-on-2 not just for the momentary time it takes a defender to show and recover, but for an extended period of time where the offensive player can survey the floor. In this instance, it leads to a wide-open three that misses and an offensive rebound.

You’ll see the same in this next clip, below, something similar. This time it’s a flat hedge from Fermin, not as aggressive at cutting off the driving angle; but he and Shulga (#11) both linger from there. He makes no attempt to cover, they both generally stand back from the ball handler with their hands up high, and eventually Dent picks out the pass right under the hoop for the easy finish.

You can tell that anything other than drop coverage was not the norm as there was no crispness or recovery from the hedge nor was there any intentional intrusiveness on the ball handler like you’d see if they were trapping out of the actions. It was simply a lack of comfort and surety around execution.

Finally, here’s one more look and this time they blitzed the ball screen, down 8 with two minutes left in the game. The game/score situation likely dictated this approach, but I thought it was much better executed than much of their other hedging. Fermin (#21) aggressively shows after the ball screen and Zeb Jackson (#2) traps as well. This time the double team is much more proactive and intrusive meaning that Dent has to look closer to simply pass out of the pressure rather than taking his time to survey the floor. When he does, Fermin does a much better job of recovering with urgency and they play straight-up man defense the rest of the way to force the contested miss in the lane.

Three different ball screens, three different approaches – hard and flat hedges, and blitzing. Not sharp collectively, but VCU (as normal) executed much better with the more aggressive variants.

Alright, now let’s contrast what we’ve seen above with how Utah State defended.

Utah State

The Aggies actually had more size 2-5 than VCU did (they also had Shulga at the SG, and went 6’8″ at SF, 6’9″ at PF, and 7’1″ at starting Center; but far less athleticism and quickness. As a result, you saw far fewer attempts to proactively create pressure and more effort to stay at home, play straight-up, contest shots, and secure the glass. This was compounded by the fact that their starting PG, the 6’0″ Steven Ashworth (#3), while often providing offensive fireworks, was a complete defensive liability on the ball. Teams targeted him, for sure, but in general it was a challenge for Utah St. to defend ball screens with their limited mobility at the guard position and without the same mobility and vertical rim protection from their bigs.

Here’s a first glimpse, and watch how similarly the Aggies defend the pick and roll but how much easier it looks for, in this case, the 2023 version of Richard Pitino’s New Mexico (compared to the 2025 version above). This is a younger Max Shulga (#11) on the ball for Utah St. Backup Center, the 6’9″ Dan Akin (#30) plays drop coverage just like we saw with VCU, but he never actually stops or stays with the ball handler. Instead he shows, slides a little, but starts recovering back to his man while the dribbler maintains his drive. Shulga doesn’t have the speed to get back into the play, and New Mexico ends up with a pretty easy layup at the rim.

Why was this so much easier to take all the way to the bucket despite a similar defensive concept? Personnel. Shulga is a less developed defender at this point on the ball. Akin neither had the mobility or the verticality/reach that Bamgboye or Clark had, keeping him from fully shutting down the driving lane or being able to rotate over to block the shot. His early departure on the drive stemmed from being worried about becoming unattached from his own man because he didn’t have the same physical traits/range. Also, you’ll note Funk (#23) at the top makes no effort to collapse on the dribble; likely because he either doesn’t have the quickness to do so or he doesn’t trust himself to get that far away from his man and still be able to change direction to close out on the kick out. All of these incremental subtractions in athleticism add up to a much easier driving lane and finish.

Let’s now pick on Ashworth a little. This isn’t terrible from him, it’s just that thing where you’re not long enough or athletic enough so the effort you expend trying to get back into the play keeps you from being able to elevate or bother the jump shot. New Mexico didn’t really have to set a quality screen here, it was a slip, but it was still enough to pump Ashworth off the line and allow New Mexico to exploit him.

We showed how defending the pick and roll against a quality playmaker was the most challenging element of Odom’s defensive scheme for VCU – but for Utah State and the drop off in quality of both their rim protection and their guard defense – multiply that challenge.

Here’s another look at it; this time with a better ball screen leading to an ocean between the chasing Ashworth and his man. The drop coverage lacks the quickness to lurch at the ball and has to respect the driver going all the way, so the room to elevate into the midrange jumper is comfortable.

Utah State had to respond to this but, from a Man-To-Man perspective, their best answer was sitting Ashworth. Here, below, they tried to drop a little less deep with their coverage, but then New Mexico takes advantage by hitting the roller (and it’s a slow rotation by Shulga to give up the dunk).

I’d say across the board, Utah State often found themselves searching for ways to defend the ball screen because they played it so conservatively. Here’s an example, below, of them getting caught playing under a screen from San Diego State (off of what was actually a pretty nice play design).

If you watch that clip above contrasted with most of the VCU clips from above, you’ll notice that the biggest difference is the huge cushion the Aggie defenders are playing from their men as they take the dribble exchanges. The Rams, on the other hand, were trying to blow those up and get their hands on the ball. This explains the ease of that shot.

Now, I did find a look at them proactively switching a ball screen. It was late in this game against the Aztecs in the Mountain West Final (the same team that lost to UCONN in the NCAA Final that year). It came from 6’9″ Dan Akin (#30), who switched onto the SDST ball handler after taking a DHO. He was able to force the pass into the post and then collapsed down and helped to double-team and block the shot, securing the rebound.

This came late in the game when Utah State was getting pretty desperate on the defensive end and after they’d tried a few other things (including zone for a while, which we’ll see later). Also, Akin was probably their most athletic player – certainly most athletic big. But, still, I’d have liked to see them mix in these slightly more proactive defensive handoffs more often; as they typically kept things pretty vanilla.

By vanilla, I mostly mean that they didn’t really offer much proactive help and just tried to defend straight up or with drop coverage. Like just kind of leaving their man on an island to chase around screens – creating this wide-open look in the corner because none of the post players jumped out on it:

Or here, below, where they just kind of pressed close to their men while SDST drove around their 6’8″ SF in isolation:

That was certainly not the most blistering drive, but Shulga’s (#11) help is just a token swipe and Funk (#23) sees it coming for a long time but does nothing to position himself in the driving lane. Frankly, he just watches.

And here, they don’t send the double team into the post, hoping Akin can defend in isolation (he bites on the up fake and concedes the easy bucket):

But that’s just how they chose to defend more often than not – stay attached to their man, try to get a contest on any shots, play it straight-up. Watching them play, it felt like Odom didn’t feel confident that he had many good options on the defensive end (but really liked his offensive talent) so he felt more comfortable just trying to simplify things on the defensive end and force the opposition to beat their man and outscore them.

When they were at their best defensively, they usually had RJ Eytle-Rock (#5) in the game along with Akin; and you’d occasionally see quality defensive possessions like this one:

That’s pretty solid on-ball defense staying in front and getting a good contest off – but he only played 12.4 minutes per game that season despite being a fifth year Senior having followed Odom from UMBC. Coach Odom clearly made the offense for defense trade-off that year.

This was one of the better defensive possessions I saw from Utah State; and it was one that more resembled the looks VCU would give. For one, they still have that aggressive sag when the ball is near the baseline here, and Eytle Rock (#5) passes off his man to linger in the lane and pick up the double team on the drive. Utah State closes out and then as New Mexico drives the close out, Akin (#30) is there from handing his man off to Eytle-Rock and switching back, and he steps up to contest the drive and force the miss.

So, it’s plays like the above where you can see that it is the same system with the same lane-crowding concepts when the ball is low – they just have probably their best lineup on the floor to execute this one, where they wouldn’t normally, and the help defenders are a little more alert.

This was like a Tale of Two Cities. We saw in the offensive piece, how the Aggies were consistently more crisp and polished on running Odom’s offensive systems than the Rams were. Defensively, it was just the opposite. They probably played his defensive system as basic and conservative as you can. My hope is that with the rosters he builds in Charlottesville, he’ll be able to have the best of both on the same team.

UMBC

While VCU and Utah St. were the starkest of contrasts, UMBC met both in the middle. They weren’t as aggressive, creative, or opportunistic, but you could tell they were more comfortable in the system and against their competition than Utah State was against theirs. This meant they had more wrinkles in their arsenal and looked more similar to the Rams; which should also give confidence that’s how Odom prefers to play. I’d say, holistically, UMBC helped and were more creative with their rotations much more like VCU, but where they differed is that they kept more depth on the catch and weren’t as proactively disruptive trying to deny the pass or get their hands on the ball. Let’s look at a few clips from the Retrievers.

Here’s a nice look at UMBC being more assertive – first attempting to jump the DHO on the wing and switching coverage out there when the swipe is unsuccessful. Then after the switch, that’s 6’6″ Keondre Kennedy (#0) for UMBC guarding the 6’5″ Isaiah Powell (#14), so I’m not really sure why Vermont tried to force the issue inside after that switch… but Keondre does a nice job of fronting the post and being alert to steal the attempted lob pass inside.

Here’s a look at them picking up full court which I briefly showed from them in that section, but we did see from UMBC a lot more than Utah State – just less than VCU. Perhaps you can directly evaluate how confident Odom is in his own defensive matchup by how often he pressures full court. Anyway, you can see that the Retrievers have to be aware of supporting Darnell Rogers (who, remember, is the shortest player in the history of Men’s College Basketball at 5’2″). Rogers hounds the ball up the floor and then has to defend the post – where he works to front and, if you freeze at 16 seconds into the clip, you’ll see his teammates on either side pinching down to be in solid help position. That’s Dan Akin again (#30), who was with Odom at UMBC prior to Utah St., playing drop coverage; but you’ll notice that L.J. Owens (#1) is much tighter on his man fighting over the screen and Rogers is more active pinching in to help. Eventually, they switch and Akin takes the ball, which leads Vermont to try another ball screen. UMBC switches that baseline as well, with Akin then recovering to the kick out. He’s probably a little late as he doesn’t recognize the switch early enough, but he forces the miss.

The defense is starting to feel more like an Odom defense again.

Another look at that trademark drop coverage with Akin (#30) again, but if you pause the clip at 6 seconds in, here, you’ll see all five UMBC defenders with at least one foot in the paint, absolutely sucking out all of the space in the lane and forcing the kick out (supported by a good close out).

This was back in 2021, so perhaps there just wasn’t quite the same emphasis on defending the outside shot, but it’s a great view at how UMBC uniquely made things claustrophobic in the lane in response to a drive (while having it support the same drop coverage we saw at both other schools).

I like the reckless abandon on this next one. Vermont throws the ball into the post and UMBC doesn’t just send a double – they send a swarm (of three guys) from both the wing and the point. The timing was solid enough so that the Vermont player is making his move and doesn’t see the kick out opportunities – but it was a bit of an aggressive gamble.

Still, I like the proactivity.

This next look isn’t quite as disruptive in the passing lanes as VCU on the catch; but it’s good team defense reading and reacting to the drive. First, you see a couple of attempts at taking them in isolation, but good pinching in from the nearest defenders to narrow driving lanes and suggest help. Then, eventually as the ball touches the paint, the man-to-man holds firm and forces a deflection that gets kicked back out to the wing again. If you pause at 19 seconds, though, you see again that UMBC sends three men at the ball on the drive to force the bad fadeaway.

Don’t get me wrong on these – I’m not advocating for the strategy of regularly sending two help defenders to attack the ball (although it is kind of interesting strategically if you time it right). It probably means that UMBC got a big confused in their rotations. Yet, I prefer proactivity over passiveness and in both of these situations, the timing is such that the offensive player can’t identify the open men and force a bad shot among many bodies. Swarming is better than being afraid to get unattached from your man.

You can find a cleaner double team of the post here, from the near-side wing:

That one was more organized and forced the turnover/travel in the post – and more resembled the VCU post trap rotations. Notably, that defensive set is clearly man – but the spacing of Vermont and the depth UMBC plays with off the ball made it play almost exactly like a 2-3 zone after about 7 seconds into the clip.

And here’s one more look at that I think best mirrors some of the VCU scramble decision-making we saw earlier. Off the pop we get a proactive switch of a ball screen by Akin to take Robin Duncan (#55) on the Catamounts. Vermont realizes the switch and attempts to go back to Duncan to attack in isolation. Akin does a good job gaining dept on his slide and keeping his arms up to deter a shot (and he has help jamming the lane under the hoop as well, had he conceded baseline). It’s that point that’s most interesting, though, as there’s congestion within the lane that shakes up the UMBC coverages. Rogers (#2) loses track of his man, Stef Smith (#0) and Horvath on UMBC, playing Center (#12) keeps his depth to deny that pass. On the kickout, then Rogers has to close out to Horvath’s man, Isaiah Powell (he’s giving up 17 inches in height there), with Horvath having to close out to the PG on the wing. This is a quickness mismatch, and Horvath doesn’t leave enough space, getting quickly blown by into the lane. Once again, though, UMBC converges all five of their guys into the paint, with Akin contesting the shot and forcing the miss.

It was definitely a scramble that ended up with a mismatch on the perimeter; but the reactive nature of the defense and the alert help defense in the lane from all five guys still made things difficult for Vermont.

So, there you have it, some looks at the third variation of the same defense, but all played a little differently. It feels a bit like Goldilocks and the Three Bears; but I like the structure and the core concepts if Odom can get the kinds of athletes he likes to run his systems. And if anyone grew concerned after watching Utah State’s defense, and I can’t argue with you about that, I’ve taken a good deal of comfort in seeing what his clear preferences are on that side of the ball.

Zone

One last thing I wanted to touch on, and I’m not going to break it down by each team but did want it to have its own section is his zone defense. The reason being, Odom didn’t really like to go to this; but he would use it from time to time to change things up. Normally, it was done when the other team was getting things too easily on the offensive end; so we saw it more from Utah St. – but VCU did also dust this off from time to time. It was mostly used sparsely; a few possessions in a row at max or sprinkled in here in there. This should be music to the ears of anyone who voiced concern about UVa not having variable defenses in recent years. Odom has a way he likes to play defense, but as we saw earlier, he will mix up his points of emphasis within his man defenses and he absolutely will get away from man defenses when he feels the need.

I saw two main options that he run, one far more than the other – his primary zone was…

2-3 Zone – Wings Extended

The first and primary zone Odom would turn to was a basic 2-3. He liked to play his two wings extended, though, attempting to deny the ball from going into the corner.

Here’s a good angle on it from straight-away. Observe how wide Eytle-Rock (#5) plays when he’s on the strong-side wing (which is most of this possession). He’s not playing it compact and trying to keep anything out of the middle; he’s shading so that he can get out to the wing and also trying to deter that pass down to the corner. Of course, this leaves him vulnerable to the back-door cut from the corner as his back is to the play, and SDST does attempt to take advantage of that after a pass into the high post; but a bobble on the catch and then the offensive player running through into Taylor Funk creates a turnover.

That soft spot behind the Wing and Center can always be a tricky part for any extended zone – but Odom’s squads felt more susceptible to it given how stretched that wing would often get.

Here’s a look, below, at them losing track of the short corner and giving up a dunk as a result:

It’s not great communication from the back side wing, but it’s still eyes forward, heads not on swivels, and getting extended to the wing and from the cutting action away from the hoop. When SDST sets that screen on Ashworth (#3), Dorius (#32) is unnecessarily far up and with no awareness of what’s happening behind him.

But here Dorius (#32) displays much more awareness. Even though both Eytle-Rock (#5) and Funk (#23) are extending far to the wings, clearly by design, he does a solid job of defending two guys when Jaedon LeDee (#13) catches the ball at the free throw line. He fakes at LeDee while gaining depth to prevent the back cut. Then he comes back out again on the token contest on the midrange jumper.

This was an open shot and could have been a make – but it’s still a midrange jumper from a post player with a token contest that could have been much worse given the coverage when LeDee caught the ball.

Generally speaking, I don’t like most non-matchup zones and I didn’t like the way Utah State played this one. They were too stretched and too oblivious to action behind them. That being said, I do like having zones as a weapon in your arsenal when you need to try something different and it’s worth noting that two of these three clips (they didn’t run it much) forced misses.

Let’s take a look at VCU’s execution of it. The Rams went to it in response to Donovan Dent heating up and struggling to defend him (as one does) especially with their drop coverage. On this first possession, they successfully get the ball out of his hands early and force a quick and contested three.

You can tell it’s the same zone with similar responsibilities but I do like the execution better. The back line is more relaxed and not cheating the corners as much, but is still there to get a hard contest on the pass past the guard to the wing.

Here, though, you see the back cut is still an issue, as this time the weak side wing falls asleep on the cut – but fortunately New Mexico riffles the pass too hard and inaccurately and turns the ball over.

You have to stay awake on that back cut when you’re going to extend your wings in the 2-3. It doesn’t seem like they practice this enough to be good at it; but the benefit of changing your defense, again, is that you can force the offense to make mistakes simply because they’re caught off guard. VCU did not execute this well and still got the ball back.

Another known issue with playing zone is that you tend to give up more offensive rebounds because you’re playing space and have to locate a man to box him out rather than being able to simply box out the man you’re guarding. We see that creep up here early in the possession – but then we also see the benefits with how Dent (#2), who had been absolutely carving them up (not exaggerating, to the tune of 40 points in this game mostly exploiting their pick and roll defense), not really have many practical ways to attack the two-man guard front of the zone and settle for a step-back three attempt.

So, one of the few games this season in which their quality man-to-man defense was ineffective because they ran into a prolific scorer, and the three possessions they play their 2-3 zone, they keep goose eggs on the board down the stretch of the game. Also worth noting that, while these last two plays were back-to-back, the first game a little earlier in the half; so they were mixing it in some.

1-3-1 Extended

This one was like finding an Amur Leopard in the wild. When their 2-3 zone wasn’t that effective (despite working twice, they gave up some far too easy passes around the basket), Utah State turned to this extended version of the 1-3-1.

Here they used the 6’8″ Sean Bairstow to extend to the logo but not directly pressure the ball very aggressively. His job was to completely shade the middle of the floor attempting to deny or deflect a dribble or pass to reverse the court. You’ll notice that Shulga (#11) extends on strong-side as well. The hope is just to slow down and make passing difficult for the Aztecs, but also to funnel the ball handler into a trap with those two players, if they’re willing to take the bait. Only if SDST comes to them, though, they are content giving some space at first and more keeping dept to force some slower passes. Notice, below, that when the Aztecs to reverse court with their pass, Funk (#23) isn’t aggressively trying to steal that ball – he has depth until the ball crosses, and then Bairstow slowly works his way back with the same extreme angle, attempting to deny the pass back to the near side. When SDST is dribbling on the top side of the screen, Bairstow nor Funk really attempt to trap – they keep their depth while suggesting the trap could come. Also note Shulga on the weak side dropping all the way near the restricted circle to prevent long passes toward the basket – but also not looking to jump this potential return pass to Lamont Butler (#5). The Aztecs to work the ball back to Butler, who takes a dribble toward the wing, drawing three Utah State players to converge, Funk has had to drop low again, and Butler passes it cross-court again to the opposite wing for a clean shot attempt that misses.

One more look at it before it retreated to the wild. It’s unique because the shortest player on their team (Ashworth) is the one playing the “1” under the hoop and their lengthier guys are playing around the perimeter trying to make passing angles hard. Look here, again, at the strong side wing lurking to represent a trap, but not taking the action of pressuring the ball with the point. It really is a suggestion that they might without real effort to. The opposite side wing typically dives pretty deep when away from the ball like we see Funk, (#23) do here at the six second mark. Ashworth fronts the post at 8 seconds and notice how Shulga backs away with no one really on the ball handler but three guys around him should he try to be more assertive toward the hoop. The ball goes into the corner and, standard 1-3-1 rotation, the 1 goes out to cover while the wing converges and the off-side wing gets into rebounding position. San Diego State passes out of the trap before it connects to the wing, and then fires it right back into the corner, pulling Ashworth on a rope. He’s able to get a good contest on the shot, though, and Funk maintains good rebounding position to secure the glass.

You’ll notice on most of these clips that quick outlet on the rebound to reinforce the fast break discussion from the offensive piece.

I don’t know about this one. It felt pretty gimmicky in how they were playing it in such a close game so late in the game when it’s not like either team was lighting up the scoreboard. But, on the other hand, I do like that confidence and desire to keep the other team guessing and, although it was a 1-3-1 zone, the way in which they ran it was creative. Notably, again, that in 4 of their 5 zone possessions this game, even though they weren’t executed very well, they resulted in 0 points.

As a UVa fan, I’m salivating over the thought of some aggressive man-to-man defense with plus athletes. But, I will say, I do want a Coach who has some true knuckleballs to float out there at times, too. Confusion can be a weapon when properly wielded.

In Conclusion

The Ryan Odom experience is going to be something truly different for UVa fans; and I’m excited to see it. It might not be fast paced on a per-possession basis; but it is downright blistering and chaotic at times by design. And he ratchets up the chaos (as opposed to trying to slow the game down) the more comfortable he feels with his team. More freedom on offense and on defense to make something happen within his framework. High energy. Volume subs. When it’s humming along at its best, you’ll see full sequences like this:

Your Center dropping down from help side to pin a shot against the glass. Your Power Forward who had been beaten off the dribble snagging the defensive board and bringing the ball up the floor himself while his entire team sprinted off ahead of him. A nice little inside-out dribble to free himself up to go completely coast-to-coast… but he misses the layup and the opposition looks to run out the other way! Undeterred, your guard who had been hanging out in the corner during the break swoops down to deflect the outlet pass rather than simply sprinting back on defense. Your PF who missed the layup has hustled back into the play and tracks down the loose ball. He passes it out and his teammate exploits the overzealous defender to drive all the way into the lane, kick it out to the wing, who rotates it to another teammate WIDE OPEN. That teammate pauses for three full Mississippis as the tumbleweeds blow by because he’s so open after all of the insanity; and drains the three.

There are going to be pain points. Specifically, so much drop coverage is going to be an issue against talented playmaking guards. We’ll have ways to mix it up when it’s not working; and those solutions will be highly variable and dependent on the opponent. That being said, what we see from the defense this coming season (and others moving forward from there) is largely going to depend on the roster build and the level of athleticism we typically play.

To me, that’s exciting to think that, although we have a blueprint, the details could vary greatly. That being said, I would love to see what Odom can do with his defense if he can max out the athleticism of his roster here.

---

Alright – that ends the section on the defense and concludes the two-part series on Odom’s systems. Next in the offseason schedule come the beginning of the Tracking A Transfer pieces – many more than normal on the docket for this season!